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Abstract
Als Totalismus soll ein übergeordnetes, allumfas­
sendes System der Interpretation und Beurteilung 
der Welt gelten, das keine anderen Wahrheits­
ansprüche akzeptiert. Totalismus wird in diesem 
Beitrag als analytisches Werkzeug für das Ver­
ständnis militanter Heterodoxien wie des Islamis­
mus verwendet. Dessen Antriebskraft entsteht 
aus der Verpflichtung, eine totalistische Weltan­
schauung umzusetzen. Um die Art und Bedeu­
tung des Grundsatzes der Totalität zu verstehen, 
erscheint es erforderlich, die Verbindung zwi­
schen Zeitlichkeit, Telos und universeller Freiheit 
als wiederkehrende Themen in der Entwicklung 
der totalistischen Heterodoxien ausführlich zu 
analysieren. Dies geschieht am Beispiel des Mah­
dismus und der Ideologie von Sayyid Qutb.
I. Introduction
A part of the literature dealing with totalitarianism and Islamism consistently 
tends to understand the phenomenon as being different from or even incompat­
ible with Islam itself, yet still underlining the perils of relativist positions. For 
instance, Bassam Tibi uses Arendt’s theory of totalitarianism as well as the con­
cept of political religion to understand Islamism and its strands as a cultural sys­
tem and ideology which, in his view, must be completely distinguished from 
Islam.1 Hansen and Kainz take this perception even further with their conclu­
sions about Western influence on Islamist thought in their otherwise valuable 
analysis, which approaches the commonalities between Islamism, Marxism and
1 Cf. Bassam Tibi, The Totalitarianism of Jihadist Islamism and its Challenge to Europe 
and to Islam. In: Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, 1 (2007), pp. 35-54. 
For a comparison between Islamism and totalitarian elements also see Michael Whine, 
Islamism and Totalitarianism: Similarities and Differences. In: Totalitarian Move­
ments and Political Religions, 2 (2001), pp. 54-72.
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National-Socialism.2 Indeed, such works have merits in distancing themselves 
from the narrative which equates militant Islamism and terrorism primarily with 
social and economic exclusion, alongside the often used concept of alienation.3 
Hansen and Kainz rightly argue that Islamists see themselves as personifications 
of the good on a mission to fulfil the destiny of mankind, yet they also -  uncon­
vincingly -  conclude that Islamism is a distortion of Islamic values inspired by 
western ideologies like National-Socialism and Communism.4 Nevertheless, this 
article argues that Islamism can be understood, first and foremost, as a manifes­
tation of a distinct worldview which we shall call totalism. Thus, even if coloured 
by their interpretation of Islamic traditions and their own cultural backgrounds, 
we encounter the basic structure and patterns which unify the variants of 
Islamism in other militant movements, which we will call totalist heterodoxies.
Rather than understanding Islamism and Western totalitarian polities in gen­
eral mainly as a critique of the liberal promise of freedom, the emergence of mil­
itant totalist ideologies should be seen as a distinct and recurrent mindset pres­
ent in an ideal development path of charismatic movements from heterodoxy to 
hegemony and, finally, ideocracy. Indeed, the theme of the recurrent emergence 
of heterodoxies which were defined by renovative or utopian goals5 has been 
explored by S. N. Eisenstadt.6 In order to understand the nature of Islamism we 
must also understand its driving force, namely, its obligation to fight for the 
implementation of a totalist worldview built upon the principles which form the 
doctrinal core of the movement. Therefore, throughout the next sections we will 
detail the nature and importance of the principle of totality, as well as analyse 
the link between temporality, telos and universal freedom as recurrent themes in 
the development of totalist heterodoxies.
2 Cf. Hendrik Hansen/Peter Kainz, Radical Islamism and Totalitarian Ideology. A 
Comparison of Sayyid Qutb’s Islamism with Marxism and National Socialism. In : 
Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, 8 (2007) 1, pp. 55-76.
3 Nevertheless, on the shortcoming of the alienation-centric theories in terrorism, see 
Frazer Egerton, Jihad in the West. The Rise of Militant Salafism, Cambridge 2011, pp. 
23-52. Also see John Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism, London 2005.
4 Cf. Hansen/Kainz, Radical Islamism and Totalitarian Ideology, pp. 71 f.
5 As a rule, utopian theories and ideals aim at or envision the complete reshaping of 
human existence. Indeed, it is important to note that when defining a movement or 
program as being utopian we are referring to forces which would result in the radical 
or complete restructuring of its target society. Having said this, meliorism is not to be 
confused with - in principle revolutionary -  utopianism, whose proponents believed in 
sudden and dramatic renewals and changes. See Frank Manuel/Fritzie Manuel, 
Utopian Thought in the Western World, Cambridge 1979; Jürgen Georg Backhaus 
(Ed.), The State as Utopia. Continental Approaches, London 2011; Doyne Dawson, 
Cities of the Gods.Communist Utopias in Greek Thought, New York 1992; James 
Hadley Billington, Fire in the Minds of Men.Origins of the Revolutionary Faith, New 
York 1980.
6 See Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt, Fundamentalism, Sectarianism and Revolution. The 
Jacobin Dimension of Modernity, Cambridge 2011.
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II. The Nature of Totality
1. Totality and the Classical Abrahamic World
In the Western world, we find the clear shape of monism and totality already in 
the work of Parmenides, which distinguishes between Aletheia ( the Path of 
Truth ) and Doxa (the Path of Opinion).7 Nevertheless, the idea of totality was 
taken to an unparalleled level only with the advent and powerful dominance of 
monotheistic traditions. From the polities of the Iron Age the classical Abra- 
hamic world inherited the concept of cosmocratic domination and a model of 
social organisation where the ruler or priestly class acted as the sole mediator 
between man and the divine. The latter aspect leads to one of the key elements 
of totality and the rise of totalist movements : the fusion between secular and 
spiritual roles. Even as their differences far outweigh their similarities, the civi­
lizations which rose to prominence throughout the classical Abrahamic world 
shared several key features. The most important common root of the great 
Monotheistic traditions includes the scriptural existence of a final divine revela­
tion before mankind. The revelation of God’s will was indisputable, a principle 
which aspired to rule absolutely and completely over the entirety of human exis­
tence, its conduct and its morals.
The relationship between totality and modernity in the Occidental world and 
across the wider so-called Axial area has been described by Eisenstadt as a series 
of revolutions which acted as the culmination of “sectarian heterodox potentiali­
ties”.8 For Eisenstadt, these transformations implied the merging of the City of 
God with the City of Man on a macro -societal scale, whilst at the same time 
remaining true, at least in some ways, to the cultural and political program of 
modernity.9 What lay at the heart of these movements was a fundamental ten­
sion between an imagined ideal and a lived reality which in effect reverberated in 
the greater conflict between two mutually exclusive visions, namely that of a 
totalizing and that of a pluralistic conception of human existence.10 Regardless 
of the identities of the nations or cultures upon which the most radical political 
and social revolutions of modernity were unleashed, their common root usually 
lies in the reverence with which they treat totality and universality. Whether such 
ideas pursued the restoration of an idealized past or the building of a completely 
new order, whether they aimed for a cosmocratic empire or a dominion of lib­
erty, their story was often one of crossing the threshold towards totality.11
7 Cf. Patricia Curd, The Legacy of Parmenides. Eleatic Monism and Later Presocratic 
Thought, Las Vegas 2004.
8 Eisenstadt, Fundamentalism, Sectarianism and Revolution, p. 40.
9 Cf. ibid.
10 Cf. ibid., p. 63.
11 On the impact of totality as a concept within European modernity and Marxism see 
Martin Jay, Marxism and Totality. The Adventures of a Concept from Lukacs to 
Habermas, Berkeley 1984.
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2. The Concept of Totalism
One of the most useful psychological approaches on the subject of totality and its 
possibilities is found in the work of Erik H. Erikson, probably the first scholar to 
systematically use and define the concept of “totalism”. He came to distinguish 
between two very different types of perception, that is, between wholeness and 
totality. Whereas wholeness connotes an organic mutuality between diversified 
functions within an entirety with open and fluent borders, totality evokes : “a 
Gestalt in which an absolute boundary is emphasized: given a certain arbitrary 
delineation, nothing that belongs inside must be left outside, nothing that must 
be outside can be tolerated inside [...]. When the human being, because of acci­
dental or developmental shifts, loses an essential wholeness, he/she restructures 
him /herself and the world by taking recourse to what we may call totalism.”12 
Crucially, the use of totalism is, for Erikson, a good way to describe a distinct 
psychological stance possessed by those individuals who are part of a system of 
thought organized around one or several dichotomies. Long before Eisenstadt 
would systematically point out to the common theme of “totalistic reconstruc­
tion” of society for many different movements, Erikson could depict the simple, 
yet highly effective polarity which is part of all totalist systems, regardless of their 
intensity. At the same time, he could draw attention to its specific use of lan­
guage, which functions as the link between identity and ideology. In this respect, 
for Erikson an ideological system functions as a coherent body of shared images, 
ideas and ideals which offers for all its participants a “coherent, if systematically 
simplified, over-all orientation in space and time, in means and ends.”13 In 
exploring ideology, Erikson also writes about some of the most important fea­
tures typical of totalist worldviews, namely earnestness, asceticism and indigna­
tion, which function as constants in the grand struggle between conservatism 
and radicalism. His approach also touches on the relation between the appeal of 
totalist systems and their necessarily uncompromising commitment to what I call 
a soteriological-simplifying principle. Such a principle is soteriological, since the 
emotional implications of decay and destruction can only be offset by an appeal 
for ultimate salvation, whether material or spiritual. It is simplifying, since it 
unites in its doctrine, whether explicitly or implicitly, the totality of human exis­
tence and all of its possible obstacles. Therefore, a soteriological-simplifying 
principle acts as a set of moral imperatives whose goal is to turn the individuals 
which accept them into better human beings and, in a sense, free them from 
their former false selves. As it shall be shown later on, we may divide totalist 
typologies according to renovative -utopian and transcendent-immanent tenden­
cies.
12 Erik Homburger Erikson, Identity, Youth, and Crisis, New York 1968, p. 81.
13 Erik Homburger Erikson, The Problem of Ego Identity. In: Journal of the American 
Psychoanalytic Association, 4 (1956), pp. 56-121, here 113.
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Erikson tells us that the loss of cosmic wholeness and the “outworn or unfin­
ished” nature of established identities is linked to the appearance, intensity and 
violence of holy wars, which are waged by individuals against the perceived ene­
mies or rivals to their “unsafe” ideological bases.14 The nature of these ideologi­
cal bases is an important one, for it must be linked, as we shall see later on, with 
the inherent instability present in all charismatic ideologies and polities.15 
Indeed, it can be said that all totalist systems tend to be charismatic in nature, 
even if not all charismatic heterodoxies, whether quietist or politically active, are 
necessarily totalist. The fervour and ferment implied in the text also leads to the 
role played by the youth in the formation and growth of totalist ideologies and 
their enthusiastic and sudden impulse to join in destructive behaviour are part of 
a process of identity formation and its expectation of comprehensive, all-encom­
passing ideological answers.16
Starting with Erikson’s own work, the literature dealing with the term “total­
ism” has remained limited over the past century, with only a few works explicitly 
and systematically referring to it. Perhaps the most important one belongs to 
Robert Jay Lifton,17 a scholar greatly influenced by Erikson’s own ideas on total- 
ism. Since such works are focused on the psychological aspects of totalism, it is 
understandable that its historical and intellectual origins, along with the relation­
ship between religious and secular influences, are given only limited coverage. 
Lifton, for instance, when distinguishing between totalism and totalitarianism, 
mostly limits his historical analysis of totalism to the preface.18 One of Lifton’s 
questions was about the source of ideological totalism and the origins of such 
extreme emotional patterns, connected as they are to man’s quest for an ultimate 
solution and for a flawless law -  whether religious or secular -  which can 
explain the aspects of existence and, ideally, can offer both material and emo­
tional fulfilment, bring “ultimate solidarity to all men and eliminate the terror of 
death and nothingness.”19 Lifton naturally concentrates on individual totalism, 
stating that it is a product of an early sense of confusion and dislocation which is 
later counterbalanced by a longing for the reinstatement of milieu control.20
I define totalism as a superordinate system of thought which possesses an 
absolute, singular view of human existence and pursues the shaping of public
14 Erikson, The Problem of Ego Identiy, p. 114
15 The literature on charisma is as enormous as it is contentious. I base my own approach 
on several theories, that is, partially on the Sohm-Weber dynamic and, in part, on 
Schweitzer’s synergistic charisma and the dissipative theorem adapted by Smith and 
Falco. See Arthur Schweitzer, The Age of Charisma, Chicago 1984; Thomas Spence 
Smith, Strong Interaction, Chicago 1992; Raphael Falco, Charisma and Myth, London
2010.
16 Cf. Erikson, The Problem of Ego Identity, p. 117.
17 See Robert Jay Lifton, Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism: A Study of 
“Brainwashing” in China, New York 1989.
18 Lifton, Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism, pp. IX f.
19 Ibid., p. 436.
20 Cf. ibid., p. 436.
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and private spheres in accordance to its soteriological-simplifying principle, 
which is, in turn, explained and legitimized by its claim to a monopoly of inter­
pretation. By its very nature, such a system does not accept the validity of other 
truth-claims. In short, it offers the final answer to material and spiritual aspira­
tions. We may thus call totalist all movements with all-encompassing ideologies, 
which seek to control and regulate all or most levels of public and private life in 
accordance with their ultimate goals, whose validity are based on claims to one 
sole truth. The term totalism is, in some respects, connected with the much more 
famous one of totalitarianism. One of the crucial differences is the fact that total­
ist systems may survive or even thrive without the presence or possibility of 
intense repression or coercion, whereas such a development would be problem­
atic for a totalitarian state.21 O f course, it is important that one differentiates 
between the ideals and goals of a regime and its structural realities. Last but not 
least, it is of primary importance to distinguish between the -  at times over­
looked -  peacetime and wartime existence of such polities.
Whether in a conspicuously religious, hybrid or fully secularized form, total- 
ism arises from the tension between idealized and lived reality, between tran­
scendent and profane existence.22 Of course, totalism is not by definition a 
direct path to political extremism or even political militancy for that matter. For 
example, quietist movements which were totalist in ideology could thus choose 
an apolitical path or complete withdrawal from the world in order to create an 
isolated virtuous community and wait for the fulfilment of their grand objective. 
Nevertheless, as a rule it is the politically active variants of totalist heterodoxies 
which -  at times aggressively -  pursue the complete restructuring of the here - 
and-now, whilst uniting ultimate aims with instrumental values.23 These two 
terms -  namely Wertrationalitát (value rationality)24 and Zweckrationalitát 
(means-end rationality)25 -  function as pillars of the Weberian theory on 
charisma and the types of social action.
For a totalist mindset, peace can only be achieved when the entirety of the 
community is won over to the principles of the totalist system, since all other 
worldviews are necessarily incorrect and thus inimical to the Sole-Truth claims 
of the totalist movement. This can be understood as the final, absolute triumph
21 See Manus Midlarsky, Origins of Political Extremism. Mass Violence in the Twentieth 
Century and Beyond, Cambridge 2011, p. 8.
22 Cf. Eisenstadt, Fundamentalism, Sectarianism and Revolution, p. 25.
23 Cf. ibid., p. 63.
24 An action which is determined by a conscious belief in the value for its own sake of 
some ethical, aesthetic, religious or other form of behaviour, independently of its 
prospects of success. Cf. Max Weber, Economy and Society. An Outline of Interpretive 
Sociology, edited by Guenter Roth/Claus Wittich, Berkeley 1978, pp. 24 f.
25 An action which is instrumentally rational (zweckrational) is determined by expecta­
tion as to the behaviour of objects in the environment of other human beings; these 
expectations are used as “conditions” or “means” for the attainment of the actor’s own 
rationally pursued and calculated ends. Cf. ibid., p. 24.
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of a distinct ethnos, race, class, or of a political or religious principle over every 
other possible conception of the good. If Lifton -  understandably -  argues for 
the importance of milieu control, I believe the answer to this question to be (for 
Europe at least) in the interaction between the monotheistic tradition, the cre­
ation of a unique telos-temporality dynamic26 as well as the tension between the 
charismatic nature which lies at the doctrinal core of most, if not all, totalist sys­
tems and the impersonal nature of European institutionalism.
One of the most insightful approaches towards the evolution of totalist het­
erodoxies into totalist ideocracies can be found in the work of Peter Bernholz. 
While his model is necessarily opposed to some aspects of totalitarianism theory 
and occasionally makes an uneven use of historical evidence, its contribution to 
the understanding of the phenomenon of totalist ideologies and their possible 
evolution is extremely important. For Bernholz, ideologies containing a Weltan- 
schaung with supreme values must be, in accordance with their doctrine, lexico­
graphically preferred to all other human aims, function as a necessary but insuf­
ficient condition in the development of totalitarian regimes, even if no 
totalitarian regime has ever existed without ideology playing a decisive role.27 
Indeed, while the drive to impose by any means necessary the supreme values of 
the ideology over all other values is central in establishing and stabilizing a total­
itarian regime, other factors come into play:
“First, an organization supporting the ideology has to be established, with a leader 
or leadership having the monopoly to interpret its content. Second, the secular 
power of a state has to be ‘conquered’ and spiritual and secular leadership to be inte­
grated in the hands of the same person or group. Third, such a takeover of secular 
power is only probable if the society of the respective state is undergoing a deep cri­
sis. [...] An ideology with supreme values is necessary for the development of a total­
itarian regime because such values, when truly believed by the adherents of the 
creed, justify any behaviour and command any action which could help to spread 
and to maintain the Weltanschaung and its prescriptions. For, since the supreme val­
ues contain the absolute truth and have to be lexicographically preferred to every­
thing, enemies and even neutral non-believers of these truths have to be converted, 
to be forced into emigration, to be excluded from the community of true believers or 
even to be eliminated. For otherwise they pose a permanent danger to believers 
because they might contaminate them with their wrong (sinful) ideas.”28
26 What modern totalist movements have in common is a strongly teleological historical 
perspective integrated in a utopian rather than renovative socio-political project. For a 
number of researchers, ranging from Voegelin to Bloch, among others, there is a 
strong tendency in perceiving Western all-embracing ideational systems as secularized 
versions of the Christian futurist telos.
27 Cf. Peter Bernholz, Ideology, Sects, State and Totalitarianism: a General Theory. In: 
Hans Maier/Michael Schäfer (Eds.), Totalitarianism and Political Religions, volume II, 
London 2008, pp. 246-272, here 247.
28 Bernholz, Ideology, sects, state and totalitarianism, p. 248.
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Several things stand out in such an approach. For a start, Bernholz rightfully 
points out the decisive role played by charismatic organisations in the formation 
and initial spread of a totalist ideology as well as its possible infiltration by out­
side forces.29 For a totalist heterodoxy, namely a small cadre of followers utterly 
dedicated to bringing about the realization of the ultimate values of the totalist 
ideology, the implementation of the totalist ideology is not merely a case of pre­
vailing against their secular rivals, it is, more often than not, a case of offering a 
saving solution to the overwhelming decay engulfing a fallen or corrupt society. 
At least in the initial phases of a totalist movement, when the influence of the 
true believers is stronger than that of other factions, the need to act this way is 
usually viewed with great urgency, which in itself necessitates decisive measures. 
This means a strong leadership, which is solely responsible for interpreting 
(sometimes recreating) the doctrine of the totalist ideology.30
The very existence of a politically active totalist heterodoxy and its successful 
achievement of local superiority can be considered clear signs of its ultimate 
intention of seeking to conquer the secular power of the state in the long term. 
Such a tendency is not only driven by the ideological imperative of the totalist 
doctrine, it is also driven by the charismatic propensity towards achieving 
absolute control. This does not mean that a quietist heterodoxy, which seeks to 
isolate itself from the rest of society, has completely and definitively abandoned 
the goal of winning secular power. It means merely that, for the time being, the 
preservation of the purity of the doctrine and that of the community has more 
importance than the imperatives of spreading the system of ultimate values to 
the rest of society. This attitude is usually due to the overwhelming advantage 
enjoyed by the secular state or by rival forces against which resistance would end 
in disaster. In such a case, if the totalist movement exists within a democratic 
polity, it will consistently make use of democratic liberties in order to ensure its 
survival and, if possible, the spread of its influence.
In uniting secular and spiritual authority, the heterodox movement turned 
hegemon achieves the status of ideocracy. Yet this does not automatically lead to 
what is a recognizably totalitarian polity. In this respect Bernholz is right when 
differentiating between totalitarian regimes and mature ideocracies as subspecies 
of a generic ideocracy. This is the case because totalitarianism should be under­
stood to suggest a transitory process rather than an end state in itself, whereas 
the mature totalist ideocracy has already achieved most or all the aims of its ide- 
ology.31 Bernholz defines totalitarianism as “an ideocracy which has not yet 
reached the aims implied by its supreme values and which tries to pursue them 
with the spiritual and secular power available after it has gained domination of a 
state.”32
29 Cf. ibid., p. 251.
30 Cf. ibid., p. 252.
31 Cf. ibid., p. 253.
32 Ibid., p. 256.
M urariu, The Nature of Totalism  3 7
One of the constants occurring in totalist movements is the duty, indeed the 
obligation to fulfil the soteriological -simplifying principle which sums up their 
ideology and sets it apart from other factions, in effect enabling them to perceive 
themselves in each individual case as pure islands surrounded by corruption.33 
This being the case, whether we are talking about a minor charismatic hetero­
doxy, a hegemonic mass -movement or an evolving totalist ideocracy, the fulfil­
ment of its ultimate aims will take precedence over other aspects, if necessary 
even if it is detrimental to its own survival. In all such cases, the demand for 
maintaining purity, whether ideological or structural, remains an absolute imper­
ative. Mark Juergensmeyer believes that when religious cultures portray warfare 
as something that is acknowledged and ultimately controlled, they are therefore 
presenting a veritable cosmological re -enactment of the primacy of order over 
chaos, with religion reaffirming the primacy of order, which requires that forms 
of disorder be conquered.34 As it has been shown previously, such a perspective 
is, of course, valid for all militant totalist movements in general, regardless of the 
direction of their ideology. It is no surprise that several of Juergensmayer’s con­
clusions on militant religious groups can be applied here, since the cases he 
analyses can be defined, without exception, as totalist heterodoxies.
Thus, in militant totalist groups the use of violence may take up the character­
istics of a mythical struggle of the faithful, within an -  at times -  eschatological 
grand scenario. Such a struggle is perceived as defending the most basic identity, 
honour and dignity of a group. As already mentioned, if the struggle and the 
aims implied by the totalist ideology are believed to be of ultimate significance -  
a defence not only of individual lives and principles but of entire nations, cul­
tures or value systems -  there is always the possibility that it will be seen as a cul- 
tural-civilizational war with spiritual implications. Consequently, due to the 
nature of this struggle, the specific ultimate goals and the inflexibility of their 
supporters, losing battle would be simply rendered impossible or unthinkable. 
More often than not, the struggle against the impure enemies might be inter­
preted as being unlikely to be won in the present time or through normal ways, 
or it may even seem hopeless in such a regard that the resolution of the conflict 
could only be resolved through what amounts to divine intervention or the secu­
lar fulfilment of its telos, spearheaded by a chosen, pure elite. The alternative, if 
the totalist movement is still a heterodoxy, implies quietism, emigration or an 
unlikely adaptation to the host society.
33 See Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger: an analysis of concept of pollution and taboo, 
London 2002; Barrington Moore Jr., Moral Purity and Persecution in History, 
Princeton 2001.
34 Cf. Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God. The Global Rise of Religious 
Violence, 3. edition London 2003, p. 162.
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3. Totalism: Appeal and Typologies
There are several themes which function as pillars of totalism and contribute to 
its power in the eyes of adherents. Firstly, there is the concept of totality, that is, 
the manifestation of absoluteness through the fulfilment of an all-encompassing 
ideology. More often than not the need for totality and the emergence of such an 
ideology are linked to a perceived degeneration and the peril of a spiritual sick­
ness within the society which hosts the totalist movement. The appeal of totalist 
worldviews should not be sought primarily in their intellectual dimension but 
rather in the emotional effect they provide to the one who lives within its system. 
Especially from an emotional perspective, totalism has the potential to possess 
great importance for an individual who has been thoroughly won over to its sys­
tem, offering a peak experience, a sense of transcendence and freedom from the 
encumbrances of human ambivalence and an experience of absolute truth.35
It may seem that one of the reasons for the emergence of totalist ideologies 
and the crossing of the totality threshold is alienation. Alienation functions as a 
term which may explain, for instance, the acts of militant movements as rebel­
lions against modernity, fuelled by poverty and ignorance. Nevertheless, this 
three-way combination, alienation-poverty-ignorance, often has little to do with 
the principles behind the totalist message and ideology. To reiterate, the most 
important pillars of a totalist mindset lie in a series of ideatic conflicts, dividing 
existence and problem solving according to a dichotomous pattern -  foremost of 
which is the conflict between purity and impurity and that between truth and 
untruth. Such a necessarily all -encompassing vision is supported by the totalist 
reliance on the relation between the pursuit of a soteriological-simplifying princi­
ple and the implicit belief in their own ultimate values. It is thus very important 
to not underestimate the ideological component of such a worldview. It is even 
more important to refrain from masking it, by explaining the violent manifesta­
tion of militant totalist heterodoxies (or what is usually defined as terrorism) by 
deflecting blame from the crucial relation between individual and group self-per­
ception and ideology to that of economic and social exclusion. The predisposi­
tion for violence should be sought, first and foremost, in the ideology of the polit­
ically active totalist movement and in the nature of the soteriological-simplifying 
principle they stand for. Indeed, the ultimate totalist triad which came to affect 
European existence -  Communism, National-Socialism and, as of late, Islamism
-  possesses a common structural pattern, as Hansen and Kainz point out: 
“History is always interpreted as a process of decline, in which a fundamentally 
evil power has brought mankind to the verge of disaster and threatens its very 
existence. A particular group of people is the standard -bearer of hope and, as 
the personification of good, has the mission of saving humankind from doom 
and ridding it of evil. This group will then realise the utopia of the classless soci-
35 Cf. Lifton, Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism, p. 439.
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ety, the natural race struggle, or the purified society of followers of the true 
faith.”36
What follows is a series of totalist categories, ranging from their dominant 
manifestations, their typology and their expansionary potential. Due to space 
constraints these will necessarily have to be presented in a very brief manner. 
Dominant Manifestations: We can tentatively identify several general ideal-type 
manifestations of totalism:
-  Hierarchical
-  Collectivist
-  Theocratic
Naturally, these ideal categories rarely function completely independently of one 
another and are often interrelated in the context of a process of (partial) interde­
pendence. Theocratic totalism, such as Islamism, is also strongly hierarchical in 
its perception of the various ranks of non-believers -  namely those existing out­
side the redeemed community of mankind. Collectivist totalism, such as Russian 
Communism, quickly became linked with Russian ultra-nationalism, whilst the 
hierarchical principles of National- Socialist racial supremacy and racial stratifi­
cation possessed the structures and especially the legitimization strategies of a 
theocratic type. Interestingly, virtually all possess collectivist traits, whether it is 
the ultra- nationalist ethnic community, the Muslim Ummah, the racial Volk, or 
the Communist working class. For this reason a categorization has been chosen 
according to which feature functions as the dominant one in the totalist system.
4. Typologies and Goals
Time lies at the heart of the most successful totalist ideologies of the 2 0 th cen­
tury. The conquest of time and the fulfilment of history drove the doctrinal core 
of National -Socialism on the one hand and of Communism on the other. They 
did this in a somewhat greater fashion than Italian Fascism which, nevertheless, 
could symbolically fall back on the almost immeasurably distant, yet still visible 
remnants of the Golden Age of Rome.37 Indeed, the Italian Fascists could erupt 
into history at the point between decline and fructification, between corruption 
and renewal, between impurity and purity. National-Socialism and Communism 
in particular were fixed first and foremost on attaining the promised future state 
and the fulfilment of their historical destiny. There are three main ideal typolo­
gies of totalism:
36 Hansen/Kainz, Radical Islamism and Totalitarian Ideology, p. 68.
37 Cf. Romke Visser, Fascist Doctrine and the Cult of Romanita. In: Journal of 
Contemporary History, 1 (1992), pp. 5-22.
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Renovative: An ideal type which is predominantly focussed on the restoration of 
a pure, idealized past -  usually that of a distinct community.
Hybrid : Hybrid totalism represents an ideal type where renovative tendencies 
and utopian tendencies are of similar importance.
Utopian : Utopian totalism is an ideal type which is mainly focussed on a teleolog- 
ical narrative, involving the future political or spiritual supremacy of the 
movement.
III. Renovative Totalism
1. The Case of Mahdism
Since Antiquity, two great traditions have been shaped and conceptualized by 
the many different Eurasian civilizations in their attempt to understand history -  
the cyclical temporality and the linear teleological temporality. The relevant liter­
ature is usually split between analysing temporality purely as a philosophical con­
cept and, more importantly for the present work, as an impact for social real- 
ity.38 Although both models managed to coexist and even to adopt features from 
one another, the underlying tension between these traditions has remained 
important. For quite some time the role of religion and eschatology39 in the con­
text of pre-modernity and modernity has been re-evaluated,40 related to institu­
tional effects as well as to ideological frameworks. Issues remain, however. For 
instance, eschatological thought, despite the gigantic literature dealing with it, 
has generally not been consistently studied in connection to modernity and the 
emergence of totalist heterodoxies, with some exceptions.41 One feature com­
mon to all consistently successful totalist movements is their start as a charis­
matic minority struggling against the dominance of the state -  or of another 
group -  into a mass-movement which attains political dominance at state level. 
Since they are usually heterodoxies which cannot be institutionally integrated - 
if the institutional background is present at all -  the structure of totalist move­
ments must primarily take into account the impact of charismatic authority as
38 See Ralph M. Rosen (Ed.), Time and Temporality in the Ancient World, Philadelphia 
2004; Andrea Brady/Emily Butterworth (Eds.), Uses of the Future in the Early 
Modern World, New York 2010.
39 See for instance Arthur Bradley/Paul Fletcher, The Politics to Come. Power, 
Modernity and the Messianic, London 2010; Arthur H. Williamson, Apocalypse Then. 
Prophecy and the Making of the Modern World, Westport 2008.
40 See Karl Lowith, Meaning in History, Chicago 1949; Hans Blumenberg, Legitimacy of 
the Modern Age, Cambridge 1999; Michael Allen Gillespie, The Theological Origins 
of Modernity, Chicago 2008.
41 See John R. Hall, Apocalypse. From Antiquity to the Empire of Modernity, Cambridge 
2009.
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well as the importance of charismatic ritualization and transformation in the 
development of a movement.
The ultimate development of the classical Abrahamic world was shaped by its 
diverging branches, namely the Western(European) branch with its gradual 
departure from religious arguments and religion itself as a centre of the political 
discourse, and the Islamic branch with its stricter reliance on religious tenets 
and, perhaps most importantly, its vision of the absolute oneness of God (tah- 
wid). It is the very concept of tahwid as the fundamental essence of the Islamic 
faith which can function as a crucial element in the tension between ideal expec­
tations and experienced reality.42
One of the core aspects of Islam, exemplified by the Mujaddid traditions, is 
the process of purification of the faith and the tendency towards a total recon­
struction of society based on its perception of the religious community from the 
time of Muhammad. These principle transcended tribal or ethnic differences and 
manifested itself in the self-perception and organization of many different peo­
ples which converted to Islam. These new converts sought to legitimize their 
new status by imagining their descent from the original community, as was the 
case with the Turanic tribes. It is important to note that the early conflicts within 
the Muslim world were waged first and foremost about appointing leadership 
and the exercise of power in a religious community, since Islam in itself pos­
sessed no constitutional theory of rulership but rather focused on dealing with 
ritual and religious law, which includes the Haddith and the early Jurists.43 
Indeed, despite its periods of increasing sophistication especially after the early 
centuries of Muslim expansion, political thought in Islam has remained over­
whelmingly fixated on its inception, since perfection had already been achieved 
by Muhammad’s infallible commandments and judgements.
The Mujaddid tradition and the Mahdist movements as a whole manifested as 
actions undertaken by totalist heterodoxies, either quietist or militant in nature, 
which sought the overturning of the status quo and the reversion to God’s origi­
nal law. This came to assume a cyclical structure in the Muslim world, with tribes 
united by charismatic movements toppling corrupt governments and forming 
dynasties of their own, thus setting the stage for the new cycle.44 The very exis­
tence of such powerful renovative tendencies was based on the belief that the 
original community and its model represented the perfect embodiment of God’s
42 An interesting case in point is made by Marranci in his analysis of the part of those 
Muslim inmates in British prisons who reject the authority of the state as being amoral, 
since it is not based on God’s laws but on human laws. Cf. Gabrielle Marranci, Faith, 
Ideology and Fear. Muslim Identities within and beyond Prison, London 2009, pp. 
123-125.
43 See Antony Black, The History of Islamic Political Thought. From the Prophet to the 
Present, Edinburgh 2011, p. 15.
44 Many centuries later, Ibn Khaldun’s overall thesis on the tribal dynamics and the 
charismatic cycles which set into motion the many totalist heterodoxies of the Muslim 
world remains both fascinating and relevant.
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law. The notion of absolute, unconditional submission before an omnipotent, 
unique deity who is responsible for all possible events permitted the faithful to 
achieve, in their eyes, freedom from human tyranny which had distorted or 
usurped God’s original laws. This enabled the community to set itself apart from 
all non-Muslims. Even if it nuanced its perception of outsiders to include 
Christians and Jews an abject existence as “protected” citizens, the fundamental 
aspect of the faith was focused on a simple, utterly uncompromising division, 
which could never be approached in a rational debate, as portrayed, for 
instance, by the highly influential Ash’arite school: one is fully moral, and thus 
fully human, only if one is Muslim.45 Arising as a response to the Mu’tazila 
school, the Ash’arite perception on the oneness, omnipotence and uniqueness of 
God led to its disregard of intellectual coherence and reason. Together with al- 
Ghazali’s work, it eventually achieved the destruction of whatever influence the 
Muslim philosophers might have had on their societies, marking a dramatic 
impact on Muslim theology and the history of Islamdom as a whole. In this 
respect it is, perhaps, particularly telling that the famous Muslim philosophers, 
from Avicenna to Averroes or Ibn Khaldun, made a great impact on the 
European scene, yet they remained little known or read in the Muslim world and 
forgotten after their deaths. Such tendencies ultimately went on to play a large 
role in the all -encompassing worldview of the movements which repeatedly 
rocked numerous dynastic foundations and in the holy wars which followed in 
the wake of their success.
If the beginnings of Christianity were shaped by debating the nature of divin­
ity rather than that of rulership and state, the situation had markedly changed by 
the 11th century. A series of momentous transformations led to the increasing 
impact of the -  uniquely Western European in its intensity -  impersonal institu­
tionalism and the gradual differentiation between secular and sacred spheres of 
activity, legitimacy and conduct.46 This was made possible by a series of events 
and cultural peculiarities, among which the gradual destruction of European 
tribal identity, the marked individualism present in European family life and the 
formation of the European university stand out. It was due to such transforma­
tions, as well as due to its own cultural and historical circumstances, that 
Western Europe alone succeeded with abandoning the divine cosmocratic 
monarchy as the most legitimate form of government and replace it with new 
forms of governments which were both rooted in law and at least partially 
accountable, long before the advent of democracy.47 This does not mean that the 
concept of totality and the pursuit of its absolute fulfilment did not make their
45 Black, The History of Islamic Political Thought, pp. 83 f.
46 Indeed, the Roman model which dominates the formation of European political cul­
ture (alongside Germanic infusions) can be contrasted with the Persian model which, 
eventually, came to influence Muslim polities in Asia.
47 See Francis Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order. From Prehuman Times to the 
French Revolution, New York 2011.
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impact felt. Yet, their progress became intimately linked to the development of 
new conceptions of historical telos and historical time and the eventual triumph 
of the scientific method and the decline of religion from the centre of the public 
space. Its militant manifestations were usually successfully kept in check, among 
others, by a combination of factors including the alliance between secular and 
spiritual factions as well as the rule of law and the successful penetration of var­
ied societies by institutions. These repeatedly acted more or less as a barrier or 
at least as a buffer against charismatic movements whose ideology and goals 
were linked to the concept of totality.
One example of renovative totalist heterodoxies may be found in the various 
Mahdist figures which arose and occasionally built successful polities through­
out Africa. The essentially renovative movements which they led represent, in 
many ways, an ideal convergence between charismatic authority and totalist ide­
ology, unaffected by institutional constraints or even, to an extent, local tradi- 
tions.48 The figure of the Mahdi has emerged in the eschatology of Islam as a 
result of a combination of Judeo- Christian influence, the tension between the 
authority of the Ulama and charismatic sainthood, the Mujaddid tradition,49 and 
the strife engulfing the Umayyad Caliphate with increasing regularity after the 
early decades of conquest. Already from the 7 th century onward recognizably 
Mahdist heterodoxies would manifest themselves throughout the Arab world, 
establishing themselves especially on the edges of Islamdom. There is consider­
able controversy regarding the eschatological dimension of such an important 
figure in Islam, with researchers being divided into two major camps. The main­
stream camp considers it an addendum to the body of Islamic doctrine. The sec­
ond camp asserts that Islam itself is built on messianic expectations and that 
Muhammad did not intend to build a worldly community but merely to prepare 
the believers for the final hour. This would, in effect, mean the return of 
Muhammad through the avatar which the Mahdi represents.50 Yet Mahdism
48 See Richard H. Dekmejian/Margaret J. Wyszomirski, Charismatic Leadership in 
Islam. The Mahdi of the Sudan. In : Comparative Studies in Society and History, 2 
(1972), pp. 193-214; Peter Malcom Holt, The Mahdist State in the Sudan, 
1881-1898. A study of its origins, development and overthrow, Oxford 1977; William 
F. Tucker, Mahdis and Millenarians. Shi’ite Extremists in Early Muslim Iraq, 
Cambridge 2008; Mercedes Garcia-Arenal, Messianism and Puritanical Reform. 
Mahdis of the Muslim West, Leiden 2006; Paul E. Lovejoy/J. S. Hogendorn, 
Revolutionary Mahdism and Resistance to Colonial Rule in the Sokoto Caliphate, 
1905/06. In: The Journal of African History, 2 (1990), p. 217-244.
49 The Mahdi, who is meant to be a unique eschatological figure, and the Mujaddid, 
which essentially represents a cyclical renovative tradition, were sometimes combined 
into a synthesis, such as during the jihad which established the Sokoto Caliphate. See 
Peter Heine, I Am Not The Mahdi, But ... . In: Albert I. Baumgarten (Ed.), Apocalyptic 
Time, Leiden 2000, pp. 69-78.
50 See Paul Casanova, Mohammed et la Fin du Monde. Etude critique sur l’Islam primi­
tif, Paris 1911; David Cook, Muslimapocalyptic and jihad. In : Jerusalem Studies in 
Arabic and Islam, 20 (1996), pp. 66-104.
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remained especially important in North Africa, with several heterodoxies manag­
ing to overthrow existing states and create their own, based on a very strict inter­
pretation and implementation of Muhammad’s laws and commandments. Time 
and again, in different Muslim societies, the coming of the Mahdi would signify 
the overthrow of the existing government or the present order of affairs and the 
restoration of the primitive purity of the faith. The Quranic principle of com­
manding righteousness and forbidding evil served as one of the primary tools for 
the preachers which shook or even toppled various states throughout Islamdom. 
For instance, the revival of pure faith, the destruction of all religious innovation 
and the annihilation of all evil behaviour51 were the main goals pursued by one 
of the most successful Mahdis, Ibn Tumart. His message represents a desire for 
a complete and total renovation of society, a moralistic and puritan vision, yet 
compatible and echoing Ghazali himself.52
Towards the end of the 19th century a man named Charles Gordon came 
down the Nile to help with a rebellion which had been steadily growing in 
strength and threatened to bring down Egyptian governance of the Sudan, tenu­
ous as the latter was.53 His opponent was called Muhammad Ahmad,a man of 
the desert and slave of God.54 They exchanged letters. The man of the north 
offered terms, negotiations and even worldly power. The man of the desert 
wrote back: “it is plain that I am the one who invites to God, and the Khalifa of 
the Apostle of God (God bless him and give him peace) and that I am the Mahdi, 
the expected one, and this is no boast. God has authorized me to proclaim 
mercy upon whosoever obeys him and follows the direction of his prophet 
Muhammad (God bless him and give him peace), and vengeance upon whoso­
ever rebels against him and disobeys him and follows his devil, his own inclina­
tion and desire, and cleaves to this world.”55
This represents a good example of the immense difference in the worldviews 
separating the two men and, symbolically, their respective cultures. General 
Gordon attempted to negotiate with the Mahdi in the way one negotiates with a 
political opponent, by offering concessions and arrangements in the secular 
understanding of power. The Mahdi on the other hand could merely continue to 
proclaim his message of complete dominion over believers and unbelievers alike, 
staying true to his principles. In many ways the rise of the Sudanese Mahdi can
51 Garcia-Arenal, Messianism and Puritanical Reform, p. 165.
52 Ibid.
53 Indeed, Gordon’s primary role in the Sudan was to oversee the gradual evacuation of 
the Egyptian presence. On the effects of Egyptian rule in pre-Mahdist Sudan see 
Anders Bjorkelo, Prelude to the Mahdiyya. Peasants and Traders in the Shendi Region, 
1821-1885, Cambridge 2003.
54 See Haim Shaked, The Biography of the Sudanese Mahdi. In: Bulletin of the School of 
Oriental and African Studies, 3 (1969), pp. 527-540.
55 George Sverdrup Jr., “A Letter from the Mahdi Muhammad Ahmad to General C. G. 
Gordon”. In: Journal of the American Oriental Society, 4 (1911), pp. 368-388, here 
378.
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be called a classic example of a charismatic cycle, when social, political, eco­
nomic and psychological realities converged in the leader’s message, whilst his 
“performance” attracted increasing numbers of followers. When Muhammad 
Ahmad revealed himself as the true Mahdi and started preaching his message, 
the Sudan was in an increasing state of social, political and ultimately spiritual 
chaos. For many Sudanese the conquest of their lands by Egypt and their -  more 
often nominal than not -  integration within the political and religious structures 
of the House of Osman was nothing short of confirming the decadence of 
“Turkish”56 Islam. Not only had the original teachings been corrupted by the 
administration in Cairo, but the “Turks” had been thoroughly compromised by 
their dealings with Christian foreigners who had repressed the slave trade - 
sanctioned by Islam and very profitable for the tribes.
The Sudanese tribal society was predominantly oral, with literacy being 
largely confined to wandering holy men and mystics. For such men, who pro­
moted the vision of the Muslim Ummah as the “embodiment of divine expres- 
sion”,57 the trauma of perceived European Christian hegemony and of Christian 
involvement prompted a strong reaction which crystallized itself, in the case of 
Muhammad Ahmad, into a return to the primal nature of Islam, a sort of sacred 
re -enactment of the time of Muhammad. Even before his revelation, when he 
was still a dervish, Muhammad Ahmad was known for his piety and asceticism, a 
reputation which only increased as the years went by, culminating in his ascen­
sion as the sheikh of his last religious order and, finally, as the Mahdi. After 
revealing himself openly in 1881, the Mahdi proceeded from the very beginning 
to re-enact several key events in the life of the founder of Islam. Thus, he 
announced himself and his divine mission by sending dispatches to the tribal 
chieftains and other notables. Ultimately, by a combination of political and eco­
nomic arguments, promises and force of will, the Mahdi was able to unite the 
various strata of Sudanese tribal society and integrate them (at least nominally) 
within a single community whose direction and future he ostensibly commanded 
and for whom death in battle was but a path to paradise.58
Having already preached in the western part of the Sudan to test his appeal, 
the Mahdi astutely called for a hijra, so that all true Muslims could be part of his 
new community. In doing so he was, at the same time, trying to deny the increas­
ingly political nature of his movement, as well as attempting to establish a secure 
powerbase before he moved on, whilst still emulating the prophet Muhammad. 
Just as Muhammad had eluded his enemies by fleeing to Medina, the Mahdi
56 Although Egypt had been de facto independent since 1821, when Albanian born 
Muhammad Ali came to rule, it was still nominally part of the Ottoman Empire. This, 
along with Muhammad Ali’s extensive modernization attempts and his reliance on for­
eigners, only served to worsen the perception of the Sudanese towards Egypt.
57 Said. S. Samatar, Oral Poetry and Somali Nationalism. The Case of Sayyid Muhammad 
’Abdille Hassan, Cambridge 2009, p. 94.
58 Dejmejian/Wyszomirski, Charismatic Leadership in Islam, p. 206.
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made his own hijra to Kordofan, where he set up the base for his own Ummah. 
This strategy of legitimization was the closest the Mahdi could get to a form of 
mass-communication, for his gestures would have been recognized by the faith­
ful everywhere, whilst Egyptian failures to capture or defeat him served only to 
increase his fame and the power of his message. As in the case of any successful 
charismatic figure, the crucial unity between doctrine and practice, which had 
been a constant companion of Muhammad Ahmad’s formative years, repre­
sented one of his greatest strengths.59 Ultimately, his miraculous powers were 
proven in the eyes of his followers when his poorly equipped forces triumphed 
again and again over modern Egyptian armies, reaching a climax in the capture 
of Khartoum in 1885. By that time, his Ansar60 had become renowned for their 
fanatical zeal and bravery, whilst the Mahdi’s message led to an increasing num­
ber of Egyptian soldiers to desert or even defect to his cause. The state which 
came after his death was built on his vision, a vision meant to outlast the brief 
British colonial presence and gradually evolve into the strands of Islamism which 
still dominate North-Sudanese society to this day.61
2. The Case of Sayyid Qutb
We have already seen how, at its greatest level of effectiveness, totalism offers a 
“peak experience” to the true believer, uniting within it a sense of purpose, har­
mony and freedom from the limits of the material world. It is then not altogether 
surprising that the concepts of concord and freedom lie at the core of most total­
ist ideologies. Take, for instance, Sayyid Qutb62 and his analysis of the battle 
between the world of jahiliyya63 and the world of purity and good, or 
Hakimiyyat Allah -  God’s Rule:
“Whenever Islam stood up with the universal declaration that God’s Lordship 
should be established over the entire earth and that men should become free from 
servitude to other men, the usurpers of God’s authority on earth have struck out 
against it fiercely and have never tolerated it. It became incumbent upon Islam to 
strike back and release man throughout the earth from the grip of these usurpers. 
The eternal struggle for the freedom of man will continue until the religion is puri­
59 Ibid., p. 205.
60 Yet another action emulating Muhammad, calling his followers Ansar, or “helpers”, 
using the same term as the first Muslim converts in Medina.
61 See Abdullahi A. Gallab, First Islamist Republic. Development and Disintegration of 
Islamism in the Sudan, Hampshire 2009; Kim Searchy, The Formation of the 
Sudanese Mahdist State. Ceremony and Symbols of Authority : 1882-1898, Leiden
2011.
62 On the thought of Sayyid Qutb see Sayed Khatab, The Political Thought of Sayyid 
Qutb: The Theory of jahiliyyah, London 2006.
63 The term is used in the Qur’an to define the “age of ignorance”, namely the pre- 
Islamic era, which Qutb elevates to a key position in his view of a fallen, corrupt world.
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fied for God. The command to refrain from fighting during the Meccan period was a 
temporary stage in a long journey. The same reason was operative during the early 
days of Hijra, but after these early stages the reason for Jihad was not merely to 
defend Medina. Indeed its defence was necessary, but this was not the ultimate aim. 
The aim was to protect the resources and the centre of the movement -  the move­
ment for freeing mankind and demolishing the obstacles which prevented mankind 
from attaining this freedom.”64
For Qutb, the ultimate goal of jihad is the destruction of jahiliyya and the estab­
lishment of a final Muslim hegemony over the earth, wherein the laws made by 
man are replaced by the only laws which can allow for the fulfilment of human­
ity, the laws of the divine. In a manner similar to other cosmocratic ideologies, 
Qutb’s virtuous community is free of constraints in its victorious march towards 
a world of peace under the banner of the creed, with its enemies being described 
as impure agents of evil and as rebels against God’s commandments who justly 
deserve their punishment.65 The conflict is thus clearly drawn, the world neatly 
and irrevocably divided into the impure usurpers of divine authority and the 
pure community which seeks, which must, at any cost, do God’s will and bring 
about universal freedom for mankind.
IV. Conclusion
Alongside totality, the concept of freedom is especially important in all totalist 
ideologies, especially so in the cases which have been at least partially shaped as 
a response to modern Western liberal democratic domination and its perceived 
negative influence on the progress of history and of mankind’s ultimate destiny. 
The danger of militant Islamism and its challenge to democratic societies and to 
non - Islamic culture as a whole does not necessarily represent a rejection of 
modernity in itself but primarily a reaction to some of its debilitating effects, 
alongside the recurrent tension between a pursued ideal reality and a lived real­
ity. Nevertheless, the focus of Mahdism, similar to Qutbism itself, deals with the 
renovation of the pristine faith as a precondition for the restoration of the world 
to a condition of bliss and a re-emergence out of decadence. Here the purity of 
the past functions as the single most important aspect, even if steps are taken for 
the creation of a new community which would sweep away the remnants of the 
old corrupt order and ensure its domination over the entirety of mankind. 
Indeed, whether we speak of the Mahdi of Sudan or of Qutb’s vision of
64 Sayyid Qutb, Milestones, IV, p. 50; Apart from the often, more or less, clandestine 
publications of the book throughout the Muslim world, there are a number of online 
publications available. http ://www.izharudeen.com /  uploads /4 /1/2/2/4122615/ mile- 
stones_www.izharudeen.com.pdf; 11.1.2014.
65 Cf. Qutb, Milestones, IV, p. 59.
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Hakimiyyat Allah, such interpretations of Islam are defined, first of all, by the 
renovative nature of their totalism and their uncompromising claims to ultimate 
meaning. In this respect, they both represent stages in the ideal development 
path of a totalist movement, from heterodoxy to hegemony and, finally, to a 
mature ideocracy.
